Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) surfaced the continuing "Great Debate" over the purpose and contribution of the firm. This ongoing discussion has been present for the last two centuries and particularly over the last 80 years. The publicly held company (as we know it today) became firmly established in the earlier part of the 20th century and has been central to wealth creation in Western society. Two thinking leaders of the day, Adolph A. Berle and E. Merrick Dodd, debated in Harvard Business Law the question of what is the proper purpose of the firm. One question gripped the attention of Berle and Dodd: namely, does the publicly owned company only seek to maximize wealth on behalf of its shareholders, the so-called "shareholder primacy" view? Berle (1932 Berle ( , p. 1049 (1970, p. 33 ) threw its weight behind Berle and argued that because shareholders "own" the corporation, the only "social responsibility of business is to meet shareholder demands, namely to increase profit". The Chicago School, as a single institution, significantly shifted the balance of opinion in the Great Debate so that by the 1990s, most Anglo-American scholars, regulators, and business practitioners embraced shareholder-value wealth maximization (i.e., "shareholder primacy") as the "proper" goal of corporate governance.
This continues to be the perspective adopted by the corporations and capital markets of the Anglo-American economies. However, European and Asian societies have not so enthusiastically embraced this philosophy. Their focus has been more on stakeholder value despite the major reforms that have strengthened shareholder-value adoption (Calori and De Wood, 1994; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001; Hinterhuber et al., 2004; De Wit and Meyer, 2010 ). Yoshimori's (1995) study showed that by 1995, 76 percent of US and 71 percent of UK surveyed managers held that the prime purpose of the corporation was to enhance value for shareholders, while 83 percent of German and 97 percent of Japanese managers were motivated by stakeholder sentiments valuing job security over dividends to shareholders.
Free markets or free enterprise?
The economic and governance systems of the world remain diverse despite the increased globalization of capital markets, which are shaping governance processes and practices in the Anglo-American direction. The dominating Anglo-American multinational enterprises (MNEs), only recently challenged by the Chinese as well as by the fierce pressure from investors seeking higher returns in increasingly shorter periods of time, have been the vehicle for shareholder-value capitalism extensively throughout the world's economies (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000) . Despite challenges, the Anglo-American, neoliberal, shareholder-value-oriented corporation is gaining influence over the more stakeholder-value-oriented enterprise (Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Stadler et al., 2006) . Equally, the global reach of the neoliberal Anglo-American firm has spawned such influence that national economic policies are no longer solely decided by the electorate or by elected representatives. Current political processes position elected representatives to take into account, if not favor, the interests of global corporations (Saul, 2005; Kakabadse et al., 2006; Klein, 2007; Knyght et al., 2011) . As a result, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom are increasingly relying on corporations and their often paper-thin PR "corporate social responsibility" (CSR) initiatives to realize community-based social goals (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007) . For example, GE, McDonald's, FedEx, and IBM (Table 9 .1) along with other MNE business rivals exceed the US State Department in size, global reach, and possibly even influence (Lord and Fontaine, 2010) .
